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INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF DRUG ABUSE:
PROBLEMS AND A PROPOSAL*
by M.

CHERIF BASSIOUNI**

INTRODUCTION

In the absence of an international coercive body, any international scheme must ultimately rest on the wilful compliance

and cooperation of the participants in that scheme. Such a commitment, however, is only attainable after the type of activity
sought to be regulated by world community proscriptions has
reached a certain level which so offends the common morality
of mankind, or offsets its identified common interest, that a
common need and desire to regulate or prohibit such activity
becomes a natural world community aspiration. Admittedly
there will seldom be a uniform level or homogeneous sense of
values amongst all peoples of the world which would give rise
to this condition, and consequently a minimum common denominator must be found to attain that desired goal. The dangers
of drug dependence are too well recognized scientifically to be
debated, and the effect of drugs on the user, and consequently
on society, is also well-established. The 1970 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) states: "Any assessment of the present degree of drug abuse throughout the world
must conclude that the gravity of the situation has deepened
during the year. Misuse of narcotic and other dangerous substances has escalated sharply in a number of countries and the
outlook is profoundly disquieting."' This recognized harm to
the individual and to all societies constitutes that minimum
common denominator which warrants, if not compels, cooperation between all members of the world community to combat
drug dependence and all its attending factors.
* Parts of this article are reprinted with permission from Bassiouni,
The International Narcotics Control System: A Proposal, 46 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 713 (1972).
** Professor of Law, DePaul University; LL.B., The University of
Cairo (1961); J.D. Indiana University (1964); LL.M., John Marshall
Law School (1966); S.J.D. George Washington (1972); Secretary-Gen-

eral, International Association of Penal Law.
***TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS
CND -------------------------------------------.-.--.-------..........
Commission on Narcotic Drugs
ECOSOC ---....---------.-.------------.-.-------.----------- Economic and Social Council
INCB .........................................--- International Narcotics Control Board
PCOB ---------.-.-.----.-.-.-------------.....-----------Permanent Control Opium Board
WHO ---------------------------.-.--.-.----.---........---------------------W orld Health Organization

1. U.N. Doc. E/INCB/9 (1970).
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Thus the obligations deriving from the existing world situation of drug dependence are twofold: increase in effective
national controls and greater international cooperation. Responsible international participation in world community processes
is by no means limited to those nation-states particularly affected
by the consequences of this situation, but extends to all world
community participants if for no other reason than the collective
international responsibility to combat criminality, aut dedere aut
punire.2
The dimensions of the contemporary world-wide problem of
illicit drug traffic and drug dependence challenge any attempt
at precise description. The trends in illicit traffic and abusive
dependence have been consistently increasing in a dramatic
manner. The ancillary effects of these trends have resulted in
serious law enforcement crises in all countries in which this
phenomenon has occurred.
The international control scheme has historically concerned
itself with opium and opium derivatives, but the variety of
addicting and dangerous substances presently available adds new
dimensions to the problem and challenges the effectiveness of
the existing scheme. Even though international control of illicit
drug traffic and drug dependence rests on the voluntary cooperation of states, its effectiveness will always be a reflection of
national controls. To this end an analysis of national controls
follows.
DIMENSION OF THE PROBLEM
Governments have recognized after decades of narcotics
treaties that, in order to be effective, penalties imposed on traffickers must outweigh the benefits of the prohibited activity in
order to have a deterring effect. Only recently, however, have
all countries enacted prison terms rather than fines for such
violations. Some countries have introduced capital punishment
for certain crimes in the illicit traffic of narcotic drugs, especially
when minors are exploited or led into addiction. But these
measures have largely proven to be ineffective as the number
of narcotics users and abusers has increased throughout the
world.
The most important drugs in illicit traffic (both international and local) are still opium and the opiates (principally morphine and heroin), which continue to present the greatest
problem to national and international authorities. The increased
2. See Bassiouni, InternationalExtradition.and World Public Order,

36 TENN. L. REv. 1 (1969).
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usage of psychotropic substances and cannabis throughout the
world has also increased significantly.
Opium continues to originate mainly in the Middle East and
in a well-defined triangle area in South East Asia along the
borders of Burma, Thailand and Laos. The People's Republic
of China, which produces opium, could possibly be exporting an
unknown quantity, since it has not provided any data to the
INCB or the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND). In Turkey
and Iran some opium seems to escape local control in areas where
it is still lawfully cultivated, but most of the production found
in international traffic comes from illicit cultivation. The 1970
report of the INCB stated the problem in these terms:
. . [E]ven if leakage from licit production could be virtually
extinguished, smugglers would still be able to have recourse to
opium which is produced illegally or beyond government control.
There are now extensive areas of such production and it is
essential that, side by side with reinforcing monopoly controls
over licit production, major efforts should be made to eliminate
[T]he regions chiefly inpoppy cultivation in these areas ....
volved are situated in Afghanistan, Burma, Laos and Thailand;
3
and there is also some production in parts of Latin America.
The principal inducement to poppy growing is the high rate
of return per hectare. Considerable acreage is located in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkey, Iran and Central Asian republics of
the USSR. The opium poppy is also grown to a lesser extent
in Eastern Europe, North Africa, Australia, Mexico and South
America.
Essentially two distinct major markets for opium exist--the
licit and the illicit markets. In 1971 the licit market accounted
for approximately 1,500 metric tons of world production of opium
and the illicit market accounted for about 1,000 additional tons.
The illicit market for opium is strictly illegal at all levels. The
illicit production and distribution of this drug has become a
multi-million dollar business operated by underworld elements
all over the world. Available information indicates that at least
1,000 tons were produced in 1971. 4 At least 700 tons were produced in the hill region of Burma, Thailand, and Laos, which
constitutes the largest single area of illicit production in the
world.
At the present time there are three major marketing complexes for the movement of illicit opium and its derivatives. The
primary and largest complex originates in Turkey, which supplies
Western Europe and the United States. The Southeast Asian mar*

3. U.N. Doc. E/INCB/9 (1970).
4. CABINET CoMMrrrz OF INTE1RNATIONAL NARcoTIcs CONTROL, WORLD
OPrUM SURVEY 1972, 10. See also CND Report of the Third Special Session, U.N. Doc. E/5458/6-10 (1974).
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ket primarily serves consumers in that area and the United States.
India, Iran and Afghanistan supply South Central Asia, with
5
overflow to Western Europe and the United States.
Opium conversion to heroin and morphine is done in various
parts of the world, often in clandestine factories which are very
difficult to detect. Morphine and particularly heroin are much
more potent than opium and much less bulky, thus much easier
to smuggle. The volume of travelers crossing borders makes
attempts at control haphazard, particularly since there is neither
a system of international customs cooperation nor a data bank
for international exchange of information.
The methods of smuggling opium and morphine base are
innumerable. Although the methods vary greatly, certain common smuggling practices have been noted. The most common
method of smuggling opium and morphine base into Europe and
the United States is the use of specially constructed compartments in motor vehicles. In Europe morphine base is often
concealed in trucks carrying bonded shipments of legitimate
cargo between states. Smuggling by air freight cargo appears
to be the least favored method, but smuggling activities by crew
members and passengers are frequent.
Heroin smuggling into the United States, for example, is
usually done by concealment on the body, in baggage, in a motor
vehicle, by sea freight or by clandestine air transport. Interestingly, domestic seizures of heroin in the United States by federal
officials increased from 1,161 pounds in the fiscal year that ended
in June, 1971, to 1,626 pounds in the fiscal year that ended in
June, 1972. Heroin use in the United States is estimated at 12,000
to 20,000 pounds annually. Arrests by federal agents of those persons suspected of participation in smuggling activities rose from
12,947 in 1971, to 16,144 in 1972.6
The dimension of the problem of drug dependence can
probably best be appreciated by an understanding of the price
levels and profit margins which reflect an extremely high rate
of return on investment. Generally, potential profits on the sale
of opium and its derivatives are greater in the United States than
7
in any other market.
Cannabis sativa in its various forms, such as marijuana and
hashish, continues to be in quantitative terms the biggest narcotic substance in the international illicit traffic; heroin, however, is still the largest money producer. Cannabis-type plants
5. WORLD OPIUM SURVEY, supra note 4, at 11; CND Report of the
Third Special Session, supra note 4.

6. New York Times, Aug. 17, 1972.
7. For example, a kilogram of heroin may be worth twenty times
more in the United States than in the Middle East.
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grow in many parts of the world with great ease and represent,
therefore, a particularly difficult problem to enforcement agencies. In the Middle East, Asia, Africa and Latin America this
drug crosses frontiers in bulk, although in some countries it is
mainly a domestic problem. Cocaine from coca leaves, grown
.mainly in Latin America, appears in the international traffic on
a smaller scale than opium and heroin, but the traffic in this
drug seems to be spreading through Latin America and to other
parts of the world.
Analysts of these problems have tended to look at them more
in terms of law enforcement than of user-demand. This is why
the international concern, as well as that of most states, has been
with repressive penal sanctions rather than curtailing userdemand. Such demand could be controlled in three ways:
1-treatment and rehabilitation of users; 2-development of a direct
control system over production and manufacture of all drugs;
and 3-curtailing the profit incentive of those engaged in this type
of illicit activity.
The U.N., cognizant of the importance of curbing userdemand for illicit drugs, instituted a program of drug abuse control in March, 1971. An Aide-Memoire released by the SecretaryGeneral called for the treatment and reintegration of drug dependent persons in an effort to curb demand for drug substances.
The statement also established the U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse
Control, financed through voluntary national contributions.
This fund is designed to develop programs of crop substitution,
improved national enforcement machinery, and research and
training in the areas of the treatment and social reintegration
of drug dependent persons. 8 Whatever these international cooperative efforts may produce, they will never be a substitute for
effective domestic control.
The current trends in illicit drug traffic seem to magnify
the weakness of the system. The CND in 1973 came to the
following conclusions:9
a) There is an increased trend throughout the world toward
multiple drug use and dependence among abusers.
b) Drug dependence cannot be classified by social class nor
attributed to cultural groups or given social situations.
c) The drug dependence situation is not "strictly a youth
phenomenon."
d) That drug dependence problem does not emanate only
from illicit consumption of drugs, but is also due to excessive
use of medically prescribed drugs.
8. U.N. Doc. SG/SM/1442 SOK/NAR/104 (1971).
9. U.N. Doc. E/CN.7/L352 Add. 15 (1971).
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e) There is an increased trend toward treatment and rehabilitation of drug offenders; however, emphasis on such programs still remains in the heroin field.
f) There is no indication of any significant rehabilitation
programs dealing with psychological dependence.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL SYSTEM

It should be stated at the outset of any study on narcotic
drugs and dangerous substances that there are no generally accepted definitions of these terms.'0 The World Health Organization's (WHO) Expert Committee on Addiction-Producing
Drugs defines the term "drug dependence" to include all types
of compulsive, harmful drug taking."
This new terminology
is found only in the most recent international agreements treating world-wide drug abuse. Therefore, inasmuch as some drugs
such as cocaine only create psychological dependence, while
others such as opium may create both mental and physical
dependence, any reference to compulsive, harmful drug taking
will hereinafter be referred to as "drug dependence."
The categories of narcotic substances and dangerous drugs
covered by international agreement are: opium and its derivatives produced from the opium poppy; cocaine, produced from
the coca bush; cannabis sativa, or marijuana; and psychotropic,
or chemically manufactured substances. The 1961 Single Convention took over these classifications and included cannabis
sativa, but failed to cover psychotropic substances. The 1971
Convention on Psychotropic Substances provided for control of
these substances. The need for more effective controls resulted
in the 1972 Geneva Protocol Amending the 1961 Single Convention.
The international scheme for the control of narcotic drugs
and dangerous substances is founded upon eleven multilateral
treaties concluded between 1912 and 1972. The most comprehensive of these treaties is the 1961 Single Convention, which came
into effect on December 15, 1964,12 and is now subject to certain amendments by virtue of the 1972 Geneva Protocol.
The operation of this system of international control rests
essentially on the effectiveness of national controls to be established and supervised by states within their territorial jurisdiction and subject to their constitutional limitations. All treaties
10. For a review of the inadequacies, of general narcotic-related no-

menclatures, see Brill, Medical and Delinquent Addicts or Drug Abusers:
A Medical Distinctionof Legal Significance, 19 HAsr. L.J. 783 (1968).
11. See 32 World Health Organization Bulletin 721, 722 (1965). See
also note 38, infra.

112. See Waddell, International Narcotics Control, 64 Am. J. INT. L.

310 (1970).
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provide that the signatory states are to adopt appropriate legislation, introduce necessary administrative and enforcement measures, and cooperate with international control organs as well as
with other countries in compliance with treaty provisions. There
are, however, no supra-national enforcing organs.
The international control scheme was designed to regulate
the lawful production, traffic, and use of narcotic drugs, and rests
on the voluntary cooperation of its participant states. It has no
coercive powers except for a mandatory embargo in certain cases.
Its three essential control devices, which are explained below,
are estimates, import-export certification, and reporting.
The Estimate System
One of the greatest advances in the development of international controls was the system of estimates introduced by the
1925 Geneva Convention and administered by the Permanent
Control Opium Board (PCOB) established by that Convention.
All states were originally required to furnish estimates of their
needs; under the 1961 Single Convention, all states, whether they
are signatories or not, are required to furnish their estimates of
needed narcotics for the ensuing year. The estimate is based on
four factors: the quantity of drugs to be consumed for medical
and scientific purposes; the quantity of drugs to be utilized in
the manufacture of other drugs, drug-contained preparations,
and other drugs not covered in the Single Convention; the quantity of drugs necessary for addition to the special stockpile of
drugs held by a country to meet exceptional circumstances; and
any amount needed to bring the actual stocks on hand at 31
December of the preceding year to meet the level to be held as
of 31 December of the year to which the estimates relate. If a
state fails to send such an estimate, the then-competent international body may make the estimate. The maximum amount importable by that country is thus established.
Though the international body which examines the estimates submitted by governments has never had the power to
change them unilaterally, it may make inquiries with respect to
the estimates as a whole and to a particular drug. The records
of these international bodies show that governments generally
cooperate in furnishing the requested explanations. Shipments
of drugs can be made to a state only within the limits of the
estimates furnished by the importing country or made by the
international body. The enforcement agencies can make a
determination that the limit of shipments to any country has
been reached. Consequently, it can recommend to the interested
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parties that they cease importation or exportation of drugs either
temporarily or permanently.
The Import-Export CertificationSystem
This device controls legitimate shipments sent from one
country to another by requiring an import authorization from
the government of the receiving country and a corresponding
export authorization from the government of the sending country. By thus controlling the movements of legal drugs, this provision enables detection of any country exceeding its import
maximum and insures compliance with the estimate system.
Reporting: the Disclosure and Dissemination
of Information
Participating governments provide the international control
organs, such as the CND, with data and information on which
the system depends. These governments maintain an import certificate and export authorization system for foreign trade, furnish annual reports and texts of laws and regulations enacted
by them to implement the narcotic treaties, and report seizures
of narcotic drugs from the illicit traffic and other relevant data.
They notify CND and WHO of newly developed substances with
possible dependence-producing properties, and are pledged to
place under control drugs which are found by international control organs to have such properties or to be convertible into drugs
having such properties. The discovery of new chemicals, such
as LSD/LSD25, and the recognition of serious effects of misuse
of amphetamines, barbiturates and tranquilizers, resulted in the
1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances.
The reporting system as it presently exists is not without
its drawbacks. For example, the data available to CND in 1973
is almost complete for the year 1970, but the annual reports from
governments were considered "poor and sometimes non-existent.' 1 3 At its 24th Session in 1972, CND had noted "the impossibility to make a reliable comparative survey on drug abuse based
only on data from annual reports from governments. ' 14 Consequently, new guidelines for reporting were being developed in
1973 and ICPO-INTERPOL was gathering parallel information.
The 25th Session in 1973 indicated once more its general dissatisfaction with the data presented. Several representatives pointed
out "the material presented contained past statistics, and that
15
being obsolete, it had little significance.'
Even so, the available data is only an estimate. This may
13. U.N. Doe. E/CN.7/L352 Add. 15
14. Id.
15. Id.

(1971).
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be due either to the method of information gathering relied upon
in each reporting state or to other factors unrelated to the problems of fact-finding and data gathering. As an example, the
USSR has consistently held that the illicit traffic in drugs and
drug dependence is "mainly a social phenomenon. It hardly
existed in the Soviet Union.""'
The problem of securing data continues to be serious. In
1973 CND reported, for example, that "there were very few data
on the abuse of psychotropic substances in the annual reports
of governments . . . [even though] . . . there was a consensus
in the Commission that the increase in the consumption and misuse of psychotropic substances (and some other psychoactive
'17
medicaments) was an alarming trend.
The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 196118
The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, went into
effect 13 December 1964.11 This convention is a milestone in
the history of international narcotics control. Ninety-eight members of the U.N. have ratified the Convention as of January, 1975,
and some non-signatories apply its provisions.
The first objective of this Convention is the unified codification of existing multilateral treaties in this field, with the
exception of most provisions of the 1936 Convention on illicit
traffic, which are to be continued. As among parties to the
Single Convention, the other eight treaties cease to be enforced.
Even in the case of extradition, the obligations arising under
Article 9 of the 1936 Convention are terminated as between parties to both conventions, and are replaced by a similar provision
in the Single Convention. The new treaty simplified the international control machinery by merging pre-existing agencies into
a single unit, the INCB.
The Single Convention also extends its control system to the
cultivation of plants grown as raw material for natural narcotic
drugs, and continues most of the controls on the production of
opium laid down in the 1953 Opium Protocol. The Convention,
for the first time since the Geneva Convention of 1925, subjects
the harvesting of cannabis, cannabis resin and 20coca leaves to the
same control requirements as it does for opium.
16. Id.

17. Id.; see also CND Report on Coordination of Efforts of Interna-

tional Organizations, U.N. Doc. E/CN.7/570 Add. 1 (1974).

18. For a concise and chronological review of the international efforts
at control of narcotics prior to 1961, see Bassiouni, The InternationalNarcotics Control System: A Proposal, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 713, 722-28
(1972). See also, Appendix II.
19. 18 U.S.T. 1407, T.I.A.S. 6298 (1961). For an analysis of the Single
Convention, see Gregg, The Single Convention, 16 FOOD, DRUG, COSMuTIC
L.J. 187 (1961).

20. A recent case in the United States (Illinois) held that the identi-
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The Single Convention requires that each party, subject to
that party's constitutional limitations, designate as punishable
offenses all intentional violations of its control provisions regarding cultivation, production, manufacture, trade, distribution, etc.,
of drugs as laid down in the treaty. Each such offense is to be
considered a distinct offense and foreign convictions are to be
taken into account by courts for the purpose of obtaining extradition. Extradition is recommended in the case of offenses against
the provisions of the Convention; if extradition is not practicable,
an alien offender is to be prosecuted either in the country in
which the offense was committed or in the country in which he
was found.
The CND and Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)
considered the need for treatment of user offenders. In its
plenary meeting of 11 November 1970, the ECOSOC adopted a
resolution requesting concerted U.N. action against drug dependence and establishment of a U.N. fund for drug dependence control.2

1

In its 1930th meeting, on 15 December 1970, the General

Assembly of the U.N. adopted a resolution calling upon Member
States and appealing to non-member states to conside- seriously
the possibility of enacting adequate legislation providing severe
penalties for those engaged in illicit trade and trafficking in

22
narcotic drugs.

The Commission on Narcotic Drugs

A division of the Secretariat of the U.N., located in Geneva,
Switzerland, the CND is in charge of administrative and research
duties in the field of narcotic drugs. It maintains a laboratory,
which is entrusted with scientific research, and coordinates research carried on by scientists of several states. The CND is
composed of 24 members. The functions of the CND are essentially to assist the Council in supervisory matters, to advise the
Council on narcotic related areas, and to propose changes in the
international machinery for the control of narcotic drugs.
The InternationalNarcotics Control Board

Unlike the CND, this is not a U.N. created board, but is a
product of the 1961 Single Convention. The INCB undertakes
to enforce the provisions of the Convention, secures estimates,
cal criminal treatment of cannabis offenders and heroin offenders is in
violation of the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution, on the
ground that the difference between the dependence producing propensities of the two drugs is an established fact. People v. McCabe, 49 In.
2d 338, 275 N.E.2d 407 (1971). See also M.C. BASSIOUNI, CRImxNAL LAW
AND ITS PROCESSES: THE LAW oF PUBLIC ORDER, 150-51 (1969).

21. U.N. Doc. E/Res. 1559 (XLIX) (1971).

22. U.N. Doc. A/Res. 2720 (XXV) (1971).
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and provides statistics, recommending embargoes on imports and
exports where necessary.
The weaknesses of the Convention can be summarized as
follows. The Convention rests upon cooperation by all parties
rather than on effective international controls. The limited
authority given to the control bodies, the CND and the INCB,
is apparently inadequate to halt or even slow down the increasing illicit traffic. There exist no direct controls over the execution of any treaty provision. This is especially true with respect
to production and quota control. The Convention does not prevent countries from entering into the production market, and
there are inadequate sanctions available to individual offenders.
The amount of drugs that a nation may stockpile is regulated
by less stringent controls than may be found in predecessor
treaties. Finally, the Convention does not apply to psychotropic
substances. One authority suggests that the number of countries
authorized to produce opium should have remained limited as
stipulated by an earlier treaty. The paper notes that the powers
of the INCB and the CND are recommendatory only and have
no real capacity for enforcement. Moreover, the requirements
for reporting in the Single Convention are such that overproduction of opium or synthetic drugs may go unnoticed for a considerable time before the INCB becomes aware of that overpro23
duction.
In a letter from the Permanent Representative of the United
States to the Secretary-General, dated March 18, 1971, it was proposed to amend the Single Convention by strengthening the
INCB in several areas. 24 The -proposal would give the Board
additional authority to acquire information about the cultivation
and production of opium in the signatory countries. The Board
could act on the basis of any information it received either from
public or private sources. Additional authority would be given
for the Board to conduct on-the-spot inquiries where reports of
drug-related activities would merit such an investigation. In
addition to the Board's current power to require parties to
furnish estimates on the consumption, stocking and manufacture
of drugs, the Board would also have the power to require estimates on opium cultivation and modify such estimates in states
where illicit diversion is greatest. Finally, the letter suggested
vesting the Board with the power to impose a mandatory embargo upon parties which fail to carry out the provisions of the
Single Convention.
23. Working paper submitted by the United Nations to the Conmission on Narcotic Drugs, U.N. Doc. E/CN.7/1 341 (1970).
24. U.N. Doc. E/4971 (L) (1971).
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Convention on PsychotropicSubstances, 1971
Strict international controls over hallucinogens such as LSD
and mescaline, the amphetamines, the barbiturates, and the
tranquilizers-including regulations more rigorous than existing
controls for other drugs, such as morphine, are provided for in
a new international agreement adopted by a U.N. Conference in
Vienna on 19 February 1971.25 The agreement, known as the
Convention on Psychotropic Substances, was opened for signature
on 21 February 1971 and covers 32 substances having hallucinogenic effects on the human organism. To date there are only
five ratifications.
Psychotropic substances are those which produce central nervous system stimulation, depression, or hallucinations or disturbances in perception, thinking, mood or behavior. In general, narcotic drugs also have psychotropic properties. For example,
opium is a depressant, cocaine is a stimulant, and cannabis is a
hallucinogen. However, "narcotic drug" is a term of art used to
describe substances controlled under the Single Convention on
Narcotic Drugs, 1961, which include opium and its derivatives,
cocaine and cannabis. "Psychotropic substances" include those
substances outside the control of the Single Convention, and are
specifically included in the Convention on Psychotropic Substances. The substances are listed in four schedules annexed to
the Convention, which provides for varying degrees of control
over the substance in each schedule.
The mushrooming development of various new synthetic
drugs and their appearance on the market, sometimes under false
or misleading claims that they do not produce dependence, have
led the CND to issue repeated warnings to governments to apply
measures of control on these substances, pending the definite
establishment of their effects by WHO. The Commission has
taken the view that commercial interests must yield to overriding
considerations of public health and must be subjected to greater
controls.
The drafters of this Convention were mindful of the many
problems arising out of the attempt to control abuse of such
substances. But, as in all previous treaties, the divergent interests of government, private industry and other interested groups
were not likely to permit a more effective treaty to be drafted,
let alone signed and ratified.
The major shortcomings of the Psychotropic Convention
include the lack of control over advertising and packaging.
There is no adequate control system prohibiting misleading pub25, U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 58/6 (1971).
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licity, nor is there a limit on the total number of substances in
circulation. Finally, there is no machinery providing for the
dissemination of information concerning psychotropic substances
to medical, scientific, or allied professions, nor is there any effort
to compile data on the regulated substances.

Analysis of the Provision of the Psychotropic
Convention and a Brief Comparisonwith the
1961 Single Convention
The Convention on Psychotropic Substances generally relies
on the scheme contemplated by the Single Convention. Consequently, the provisions of the two Conventions are alike in many
respects. The 1971 Convention obligates parties to control
previously uncontrolled substances. Article 2 obligates the
signatories to do the following:
require licenses for manufacture, trade and distribution
(i)
as provided in article 8;
(ii)
require medical prescriptions for supply or dispensing as
provided in article 9;
(iii) comply with the obligations relating to export and import provided in article 12, except in respect to another
party having given such notice for substance in question.
Article 7 deals with other restrictive provisions applicable to
substances in Schedule I.
The Convention on Psychotropic Substances makes, however,
more use of the expertise of WHO. A report by the Bureau of
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs dated August 10, 1972, gives an
analysis of the new power given WHO:
Although the Convention does not give WHO authority to
veto a Commission decision, Article 2 does provide WHO with a
degree of practical power which is compelling, if not absolute.
Under Article 2, paragraph 4 (see above), WHO is wholly responsible for making a medical and scientific assessment of a
substance which is being considered for international control;
and paragraph 5 specifies that these 'assessments shall be determinative as to medical and scientific matters.' Although
CND may take into account 'economic, social, legal, administrative and other factors' as well as the WHO assessment in
arriving at its conclusion, it is unthinkable that the responsible
representatives of the twenty-four States members [this number
increased to thirty on January 1, 1973] of the Commission
would26virtually ignore the scientific and medical findings of
WHO.

Providing for special means of controlling such preparations,
the Convention relies on the same indirect method of the pre26.

BUREAu OF NARcoTIcs AND DANGEROUS DnUGS,

DiscussioN

A

COMPREHENSrvE

OF THE SALIENT FEATUREs OF THE CoNvENTioN

VIENNA (1971).

ADOPTED AT
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vious narcotics treaties. Some of the escape clauses are, however,
quite noticeable. One such clause is Article 3-2 which exempts
countries from certain requirements with respect to preparations
whenever the substance creates little or no risk of abuse. The
method of record-keeping and control from manufacture to consumption, including distribution, warehousing and shipment, is
left to each signatory without international control.
Article 15 provides that the Parties to the Convention will
undertake an obligation to maintain a system of inspection of
manufacturers, exporters, importers, wholesale and retail distributors, and of medical and scientific institutions which use psychotropic substances.
Article II obligates "institutions for hospitalization and care
and scientific institutions" to maintain records regarding the use
of Schedule II substances. The Report of the U.S. Bureau of
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs concludes that the reporting provisions of Article II neither apply to individual physicians nor
undermine the confidentiality of the physician-patient relation27
ship.
The Commission and the Board undertake essentially the
same functions under the Psychotropic Convention as they do
with respect to the 1961 Single Convention. The Psychotropic
Convention permits international travelers to carry small
amounts of substances for personal use provided such substances
are lawfully obtained. The Single Convention makes no such allowance. All manufacturing, trade and distribution of psychotropic drugs must be licensed under the new Convention unless
a Party applies for an exemption because of exceptional circumstances. Such circumstances include physicians conducting medi28
cal or scientific -research in their offices.
The Single Convention requires no form of licensing for the
manufacture, trade or distribution of narcotic drugs if said activities are conducted by government enterprise. The new convention requires the Parties to set up a system of inspection regarding the manufacture, trade, distribution, or medical or scientific
use- of any psychotropic substance. No such requirement is
imposed by the Single Convention. The provisions with respect
to actions to be taken against illicit traffic are identical, except
for the additional requirement in the 1971 Convention that any
Party discovering an instance of illicit trafficking shall immediately report such incidence to any other Party directly concerned.
The 1971 Convention contains no explicit provision allowing for
27. Id.
28. Id.
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the seizure and confiscation of illicit drugs as does the 1961 Single
Convention.
Article 19 of the Psychotropic Convention provides essentially the same enforcement measures as the 1961 Single Convention. The INCB is empowered to request information and demand explanations from Parties when it feels the objectives of
the Convention are seriously endangered. Where cooperation is
not forthcoming, the Board is empowered to make public reports
concerning a non-complying party and/or recommend that an
embargo be placed on such signatory country.
The PenalProvisionsand Sanctions Approach
in the Convention on Psychotropic Substances
and the Single Convention
The territorial principle of jurisdiction is invoked in both
Conventions, as it is throughout all of the narcotics treaties. Signatories are urged, however, to prosecute or, alternatively, to
extradite individual violators on the additional theory of "universality" because violation of the narcotics treaties constitutes
an "international crime." Article 22 of the Convention on
Psychotropic Substances and Article 36 of the Single Convention
relate to the penal provisions of their respective Convention.
Portions of both articles are identical.
Provisions of Section 2 impose a duty upon the signatory
state to punish violations of this Convention by making such
violations a crime under municipal law, but do not disallow
multiple prosecutions and repeated punishment in every territory or state in violation of the principle of double jeopardy (NE
BIS IDEM) .29 (However, see Art. 36, sec. 2, a, iv.) Significantly, they make conspiracy a crime even though that type of
offense is rarely found in countries outside the Anglo-American
legal system and those countries which have been inspired by
the common law. The penal provisions further provide for a partial recognition of foreign penal judgments with respect to
recidivists without regard for the rights of the offender in such
cases, and fail to set forth the basis for such cooperation between
states with respect to the recognition and consequences of
foreign penal convictions. The most astonishing observation is
that these penal provisions do not require states to include the
offense of illicit narcotic traffic (cultivation, manufacturing, sale,
transportation and their derivative operations) in their extradition treaties or reciprocal practices. Even when a state agrees
to extradite such offenders, the provisions have an obvious escape
clause; if, in the opinion of the state of refuge, the offense is
29. BAssioumx, supra note 20, at 126-36.

18

The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure

[Vol. 9:3

"not sufficiently serious," it does not have to extradite the
accused offender. Recognizing the principle of "universality"
which allows any state wherein the offender may be found to
prosecute for the offense as an alternative to extradiction, the
Convention nonetheless suggests only the "desirability" of making it an extraditable offense. This explains why so few treaties
contain such violations in their list of extraditable offenses.80
A particularly laudable feature which appears in the Psychotropic Convention is its concern with the treatment of drugdependent persons. The promise of this feature is likely to remain hollow and its implementation very doubtful in view of
the resources and services it would require. Judging by the
experience of the various heroin addiction programs in several
countries, it is likely to be a problem of extraordinary proportions.
Article 22-1 provides that parties may provide treatment,
education, after-care, rehabilitation and social reintegration for
drug abusers as an alternative to conviction or punishment.
Moreover, Article 20 speaks in terms of preventing drug abuse
and the promotion of programs designed to rehabilitate and educate rather than punish. Such humane understanding has not
been prevalent in other treaties, but these provisions suggest that
over-emphasis on punitive and retributive conceptions of narcotics control are giving way to a more scientific and humanitarian approach.
The results of scientific tests and pharmacological distinctions between cannabis sativa, opium-morphine and cocaine are
not reflected in either of these Conventions (other than in the
schedules), both of which are primarily penal in their orientation
and only secondarily treatment-rehabilitation oriented. In this
respect, the Psychotropic Convention is more attuned to contemporary scientific research findings than its 1961 predecessor. One
reason may well be the progress accomplished in the decade of
scientific research that separates these conventions.
The 1972 Geneva Protocol Amending the 1961
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs3 1
On May 20, 1971, ECOSOC called a plenipotentiary conference to consider proposed amendments to the 1961 Single Convention. All signatories and members of the United Nations and
its specialized agencies were eligible to participate. The conference was conveied at Geneva, Switzerland, and ninety-seven
30. For a list of U.S. extradition treaties, see M.C.
NATIONAL EXTRADIjioN AND

WoRD

PUBLic ORDim

31. U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 3/8 (1972).

BAssIouNi, INTER-

78-85 (1974).
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(97) participants were registered, of which three (3) were
observers.
The amendment process had been initiated by the United
States in March, 1971, and in October, 1971, France, Peru and
Sweden proposed additional amendments. The amendments proposed were revised and sponsored by nineteen (19) nations,8 2
but shortly before the conference convened, an additional eleven
(11) nations83 became sponsors. The Conference adopted the
Amending Protocol by a vote of seventy-one in favor, none
against and twelve abstentions. It is now open for signatures
to all parties to the Single Convention (or parties adhering
thereto), and will enter into force upon adhesions by forty
nations. As of January, 1975, sixty-seven states have signed,
some subject to ratification. 4 The Amending Protocol continues
to rely on the indirect scheme of control, depending too significantly on governmental cooperation without direct enforcement
sanction or even independent fact-finding machinery. Nonetheless, it did make certain notable improvements in the present system.
The CNB is to be enlarged, with staggered terms to insure
continuity, and strengthened by virtue of the appointment of its
secretary by the Secretary-General. The competence of the
Board is increased, with its functions now being directed to the
control of both illicit and licit activities; heretofore, only the
latter was within the Board's authority. The estimate system
will be bolstered by the Board's requirement that information be
transmitted on forms provided by the Board. Other information
will be received from a broader range of sources, including the
United Nations and its specialized agencies.
The Board is given the right to establish, communicate, and
publish its own estimates, even if governments disagree. It can
also refer matters to the CND, ECOSOC, and the General
Assembly to assure compliance with the terms of the Convention.
This is probably the closest form to a direct enforcement scheme
that international cooperation has ever achieved. Where the
Board has reason to believe that the aims of the Single Convention are endangered by the failure of a country to carry out its
obligations, it may ask the country for explanations or propose
remedial measures where necessary. Should a country fail to
provide a satisfactory explanation or to adopt remedial measures,
32. Argentina, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark Federal Republic of
Germany, Finland, France, Ghana, Greece, Haiti, Iran, Italy, Laos, Norway, Panama, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Uruguay.
33. Brazil, Cambodia, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Indonesia,
Ireland, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Thailand, and Venezuela.
34. See Appendix.
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the Board may call this to the attention of the other countries
with appropriate recommendations and with potential submission to the General Assembly. It is significant that for the first
time in history parties to an international agreement consider
the drug situation to be so serious and so universal that it may
merit the attention of the most representative U.N. political
organ.
The Amending Protocol permits extradition on a multilateral level. A provision allows those parties which make extradition provisional on the existence of a treaty to consider the
Convention itself as the legal basis for extradition with respect
to drug offenses. This solution fills a considerable gap in the
1961 Convention, wherein extradition was conditioned upon independent extradition agreements.
Further measures of the Amending Protocol provide that all
parties to the Single Convention as amended will be committed
to give special attention to the prevention of drug abuse, and
to the treatment and rehabilitation of persons affected by drugs.
Realizing the importance of curbing user-demand, the Protocol,
relying on the rehabilitative approach, also proposed that governments undertake such programs as drug education and other
measures to prevent drug abuse.
Unfortunately, a full and accurate review of the achievements of the Conference must reveal that an article of the
Amending Protocol gives each signatory state the full right to
reserve out the application of many of the important provisions
discussed above. Most noteworthy of these provisions is that
with respect to the use of the Single Convention itself as a multilateral basis for extradition. Although many of the provisions
may be reserved out by the signatories, often by use of a "best
efforts" clause, the indirect scheme has progressed in the direction of a more effective international control scheme, particularly
in view of the prevailing difficulties in achieving harmonious
cooperative undertakings at the international level.
COMPARATIVE LEGISLATION

The -illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and the criminal activities of traffickers are of grave concern to the world community.
The international nature of the offense requires the application
of the principle of universality of jurisdiction in national criminal
legislation and calls for punishment of violators irrespective of
their nationality or the place of their crime. Thus, when international traffickers cannot be prosecuted in the country in which
they are found, they should be extradited to a country which
is willing to try them. This is not accomplished, however, by
a "desirability" clause in narcotics treaties, but by a mandatory
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clause coupled with a multilateral extradition treaty as part of

the international control scheme. Earlier agreements were
limited to formulation of rather vague provisions, accompanied
by escape clauses, in order to secure adherence by countries
which would otherwise never accept stipulations basically different from their national standards. The 1961 Single Convention,

besides expressing the desirabilityof making narcotic crimes subject to extradition (a provision it takes over from an earlier
treaty) requires Parties to take action against the illicit traffic
and to provide for the punishment of narcotic offenses. The
wording of these obligations, however, makes them no more than
a "best efforts" undertaking. The 1972 Geneva Protocol amending the 1961 Single Convention imposes a duty to extradite or
prosecute. Governments are required to furnish to the Secretary-General particulars of each important case of illicit traffic,
the source from which drugs are obtained for such illicit traffic
and the methods employed by illicit traffickers.
A Brief Survey of National Laws and Penalties
on the Control of Drugs 5
The following chart has been prepared from information
received from 126 countries between September, 1972 and July,
1973. It was made in such a way as to provide an easy comparison to the reader even though at the risk of having oversimplified matters.
Some countries, like the United States, have State and territorial laws, as well as national laws, which frequently impose
more severe penalties. The majority of the drug laws include
related offenses such as maintaining an illegal establishment and
possession of illegal equipment. Many nations provide for
confiscation of illegal drugs and equipment, and seizure of
vehicles or property used in the commission of a crime. In
addition, most countries provide for expulsion of aliens convicted
of drug crimes subsequent to the service of any sentence imposed.
Almost all of the nations provide penalties for attempting or
being an accessory to a crime and many include conspiracy and
related offenses.
The terminology used in this analysis was chosen to be as
uniform as possible. The term "trafficking" includes sale, delivery, distribution, transporting, and in most countries, receiving, accepting and giving away. The term "narcotics" includes
cocaine and the term "marihuana" includes all cannabis products.
35. This consultation was done in preparation of the 1973 Abidjan
World Peace Through Law Conference and resulted in the publication
by the World Peace Through Law Center of a Work Paper on International Control of Drugs (M.C. Bassiouni ed. 1973).
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CONCLUSIONS AND A PROPOSAL FOR AN ALTERNATIVE SCHEM0 6

The indirect method of control is endemically weak because
its control scheme relies on the willingness and effectiveness of
multiple participants in a process in which not all share the same
degree of concern and interest. These weaknesses, discussed
throughout this report, are only some of those which persons
concerned with the problem have identified over the years. The
general scheme of the alternative proposed is as follows:
1- A direct control scheme whereby an international agency
would have in the case of the opiates the monopoly of production,
distribution, warehousing and sale; in the cases of cocaine and
cannabis sativa drugs, the powers of indirect supervision and in
the case of psychotropic substances the power of supervising local
controls devices; and
2- Promulagation of minimum standards of treatment of
drug dependent persons applicable indirectly by each state, but
subject to the international agency's supervision with an international financial subsidy scheme wherever needed.
The Direct Control Scheme would be administered by an

entirely restructured INCB, to be known as the International
Drug Control Agency, composed of six functional boards. 37 The
International Drug Control Agency would consist of twelve
members elected for terms of four years each by the General
Assembly of the U.N. The Secretary-General of the U.N. would
appoint a thirteenth member to act as Chairman of the Agency.
Each of the five boards under the Agency would be chaired by
one member of the Agency to be elected by the Agency for a
term of two years. Primarily the Agency would function to
coordinate and supervise the activities of the five operating
Boards.
In September, 1974 the XIth International Congress of Penal
Law convened in Budapest and its recommendations with respect
to the international system and this writer's proposal were
reported by Mr. Alfons Noll, Secretary of the Commission on
Narcotic Drugs as follows:
1. All regions of the world are affected in some way by
production, manufacture, trade, traffic or consumption of
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances as well as by some
secondary aspects of related problems.
2. The drug problem is of world-wide concern and requires urgently increased co-operation between all States and
relevant international organizations and agencies.
3. Co-operation among States should be manifested initially by:
36. For a more detailed treatment of this proposal see Bassiouni,

The International Narcotics Control System,: A Proposal, 46
L. REv. 713, 758-63 (1972).

37. See text accompanying note 38 infra.
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a. Ratification of, or accession to, the Single Convention
on Narcotic Drugs 1961, and the 1972 Protocol amending this
Convention;
b. Ratification of, or accession to, the 1971 Convention
on Psychotropic Substances;
c. Increased collaboration on the international, regional
and bilateral level in programs dealing with law enforcement, judicial functions, scientific research, treatment-rehabilitation and any other appropriate measures to prevent
drug abuse.
4. The emphasis of international and national drug control schemes shall be altered from purely repressive to more
socially oriented.
5. In view of the various efforts made by the UN organization, its specialized agencies and other international organs
and organizations, emphasis should be put on efficient coordination which should be ensured by the United Nations,
with the view of ultimately achieving effective international
control of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, other international control schemes-besides strengthening the existing
system-should be considered. This could be done by e.g. a direct international control scheme. Another field of consideration is the integration of international drug control measures
into broader systems of social and human protection.
6. The United Nations, international agencies and concerned organizations should develop more studies especially
about psychotropic substances and their effect to alert the
public at large and governments of the potential dangers involved in such substances and of the urgent need for putting
them under efficient and constantly up-dated control.
7. All States are urged to provide more data and exchange of information as to all aspects of the problem of drugs
so that the control systems can be scientifically and factually
based.
8. The United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control
(UNFDAC) should devote resources for evaluating intervention programs. Therefore it is recommended that UNFDAC
be given increased resources, inter alia for this purpose.
For a better understanding and evaluation of resolution V as
adopted by the Congress, it is necessary to refer to chapter V
('International Drug Control') of the General Report submitted
jointly by the Reporter General and the Deputy Reporter
General. Its contents are predominantly based on the research
work carried out by the Deputy Reporter General, Professor M.
Cherif Bassiouni, USA.
The General Report, submitted in writing for the Congress's
deliberations, qualified the present international control system
as an 'indirect control scheme' because it is 'predicated on the
voluntary assumption by States of treaty obligations which are
then implemented by each national system'. It concluded that,
'judging by the increased rate of drug dependence everywhere
in the world, the present system has proved to be ineffective',
and that it 'must give way to a direct international control
system'.
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Accordingly, the General Report proposed a new international scheme 'predicated on the theory of direct control by an
independent international organization'. Although it is impossible to describe fully the essentials of this proposal, the
operative principles and the functional outline of operation of
this direct control scheme should be briefly mentioned.
According to the proposal in the General Report, the direct
control scheme should comprise the following operative principles: 'establishment of a specialized UN Agency to deal exclusively with this matter; abolition of all forms of cultivation,
manufacturing, sale and distribution of any of the following, except under the terms of this Agency's authority: (a) prohibition
of opium and its derivative morphine, produced from the opium
poppy, and cocaine, produced from the coca bush, (b) worldwide monopoly of the international Agency for the cultivation
and manufacture of substances for item (a) as needed for medical
and scientific purposes; and development within the Agency of
an international control and sanctions scheme through a multilateral treaty'.
With regard to the functional outline of operation of the
direct control scheme, the General Report provided that the UN
Agency be named the 'International Narcotics Control Agency'
and consist of twelve members elected for a term of four years
each by the UN General Assembly, with a thirteenth member apThe
pointed by the Secretary-General to act as chairman.
Agency should have six functional boards to be chaired by one
of the members of the Agency serving for a two-years term. The
functional boards should be: (a) Central Board for the production and distribution; (b) Central Drug Control Board as the
enforcement arm in the direct control scheme; (c) Arbitration
Board for the resolution of drug-related disputes; (d) Clearing
House Commission; (e) Central Board for the Treatment and
Study of Drug Dependence; and (f) Central Legislative Board.
However, in introducing the General Report on this item and
opening the debate in Section II, the Deputy Reporter General
pointed out that the new direct international control scheme, as
proposed in the General Report, would not necessarily have to
be considered as the only subject of discussion in Section II; this
proposal could very well be regarded as only one possible solution for the revision of the international drug control scheme.
Following the interventions by some participants, Section II then
decided not to take the 'proposed international scheme' in the
General Report as basis for its deliberations but to refer rather
to the conclusions of the Colloquium in New York, which later,
subject to some amendments, formed the basis of resolution V
of the Congress on 'international drug control'.
Recognizing that all regions of the world are in one way or
the other affected by either primary or secondary aspects of the
drug problem, the Congress stressed the urgent need for increased co-operation at the international, regional and bilateral
level, both between States themselves and between States and
relevant international organizations and agencies (see paras. 1, 2
and 3 (c) of resolution V).
It should be noted that at the same time the Congress real-
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ized the need for better co-ordination of all the efforts undertaken in this field and therefore emphasized that 'efficient coordination should be ensured by the United Nations' (see first
sentence of para. 5 of resolution V). By pointing to this need for
efficient co-ordination and entrusting the United Nations with
the role of co-ordinator, the Congress acted entirely in line with
resolution 1777 (LIV) of the Economic and Social Council on 'Coordination of activities of international organs and organizations
in the struggle against the abuse of drugs' which has entrusted
the Secretary-General with this problem. A proposal of the Colloquium in New York to contemplate a central UN administrative agency for this co-ordination has, however, not been
adopted.
In para. 3 of resolution V, the Congress agreed that 'cooperation amongst States should be manifested initially by the
ratification of, or accession to, the Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs, 1961, and the 1972 Protocol amending this Convention,
and the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances'. It thus
followed the conclusions reached at the New York colloquium
and thereby decided to stick to the present international drug
control scheme-which is closely linked with these three most
recent treaties-rather than to change the international drug control system towards a 'direct control scheme'.
Following the discussions in Section II and the recommendations of its Resolutions Committee, the Congress, however, agreed
that, besides strengthening the existing system, other international control schemes should be considered with a view to
ultimately achieving effective international control of narcotic
drugs and psychotropic substances. It thus took a rather moderate view and agreed that the possibility of a 'direct international control scheme' should also be included in the search for
an improved international control scheme and that the integration of international drug control measures into broader systems
of social and human protection should also be taken into consideration (see sentences 2, 3 and 4 of para. 5 of resolution V).38
The major problem of the international control of drugs is
due to the hybrid nature of a scheme which seeks to control licit
and illicit traffic simultaneously. The structures that have been
developed are not capable of controlling both aspects of the problem. Reliance upon the good will and voluntary participation
of sovereign nations without appropriate sanctions are not sufficiently effective to confront a problem of such magnitude. It
is hoped that increased international cooperation will lead to a
more direct control system with correspondingly effective enforcement machinery. Although the international system will
seldom achieve uniform social values among all nations, the
rising incidence of drug abuse bears further study. Increased
recognition of the social aspects of drug abuse must coincide with
the institution of such a direct control scheme.
38. Noll, Drug Abuse and Its Prevention, 27 BuLL. ON NAxconcs 37,
43-47 (1975); see aLso 44 REvuE INT'L DE DRorr PEAL (1973).
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APPENDIX I
NOTE: The symbols used indicate:
x -States having signed without reservation as to acceptance or deposited an instrument of ratification, an acceptance, and territories in respect of which the treaties are deemed to apply.
d -States having declared themselves bound by the treaty the application of which had previously been extended to their territory.
s -Signature subject to ratification or acceptance.
r -Reservation and/or declaration.

State, territory or area

Single
Convention
of 30 March
1961

Convention on

Psychotropic
Substances
of 21 February
1971

Protocol of

25 March 1972
amending the
Single
Convention

Afghanistan
x
Albania
Algeria
xr
Argentina
x
sr
xr
Australia
x
8
x
Ashmore and Cartier Islands
x
Australian Antarctic Territory
x
Cocos (Keeling) Islands
x
Christmas Island
x
Heard and MacDonald Island
x
New Guinea (under
Australian Administration)
x
Norfolk Island
x
Papau
x
Austria
Bahamas
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belgium
Bhutan
Bolivia
Botswana
Brazil
Bulgaria
Burma
Burundi
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Repub
Cameroon
Canada
Central African Republic
Ceylon (See Sri Lanka)
Chad
Chile
China
Colombia
Congo
Costa Rica
Cuba
Cyprus
Czechoslovakia
Dahomey
Democratic People's Republic
of Korea*
Denmark
Greenland
(* indicates that the State is not a member of the United Nations)

1975]

International Aspects of Drug Abuse

State. territory or area

1

Convention on
Protocol of
Single
Psychotropic
25 March 1972
Substances
amending the
Convention
Single
March of 21 February
of 301961
1971
1Convention

Democratic Yemen
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Equatorial Guinea
Ethiopia
Fiji
Finland
France
Gabon
Gambia
German Democratic Republic (East)
Germany, Federal Republic of (West)
Ghana
Greece
Grenada
Guatemala
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau*
Guyana
Haiti
Holy See*
Honduras
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Ivory Coast
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kenya
Khmer Republic
Kuwait
Laos
Lebanon
Lesotho
Liberia
Libyan Arab Republic
Liechtenstein*
Luxembourg
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Maldive Islands
Mali
Malta
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico
Monaco*
Mongolia
Morocco
Nauru*
Nepal
Netherlands

x

xr

x

xr

xr

(* indicates that the State is not a member of the United Nations)

44

The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure

State, territory or area

[Vol. 9:3

Convention on
Protocol of
Single
Psychotropic
s25
March 192
Convention
Substances
amending the
Single
of 30 March of 21 February
1961
1971
Convention

Netherlands Antilles
x
Surinam
x
New Zealand
x
Cook Niue and
Tokefau Islands
x
Nicaragua
x
Niger
x
Nigeria
x
Norway
x
Oman
Pakistan
xr
Panama
x
Paraguay
x
People's Democratic Republic
of Yemen
(See Democratic Yemen)
Peru
x
Philippines
x
Poland
xr
Portugal
x
Qatar
Republic of Korea*
x
Republic of Viet-Nam*
x
Romania
xr
Rwanda
San Marino*
Saudi Arabia
xr
Senegal
x
Sierra Leone
Singapore
x
Somalia
South Africa
xr
Spain
x
Spanish Sahara
Sri Lanka
xr
Sudan
x
Swaziland
Sweden
x
Switzerland*
xr
Syrian Arab Republic
x
Thailand
x
Togo
x
Tonga
d
Trinidad and Tobago
x
Tunisia
x
Turkey
x
Uganda
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist
Republic
xr
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics
xr
United Arab Emirates
United Arab Republic
(See Egypt)
United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland
x
Antigua
x
Bermuda
x
British Honduras
x
British Solomon Islands
x
Brunei
x
Cayman Islands
x
(* indicates that the State is not a member of the

s

s

x

S
x
x

x
x

x
sr

S
xr
x

s
x

x
s
xr
S
x

xr
x
x

S

x

x
x

s

s
x

s

sr

s
S

sr
sr

s

S

United Nations)

19751

International Aspects of Drug Abuse
Single
Convention
of 30 March
1961

State, territory or area

Dominica
Falkland Islands (Malvinas)
Gibraltar
Gilbert and Ellice Islands
Hong Kong
Montserrat
New Hebrides
Saint ChristopherNevis-Anguilla
St. Helena'
St. Lucia
St. Vincent
Seychelles
Southern Rhodesia
Turks and Caicos Islands
Virgin Islands (British)
United Republic of Tanzania
United States of America
Upper Volta
Uruguay
Venezuela
Western Samoa*
Yemen
Yugoslavia
Zaire
Zambia

Convention on' Protocol or
Psychotropic
25 March 1972
Substances
amending the
of 21 February
Single
1971
Convention

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

(* indicates that the State is not a member of the United Nations)

APPENDIX II
International Agreements Relating to the Regutation of Narcotic
Drugs Prior to 1961
The Hague Convention of 1912, 38 Stat. 1912, 8 L.N.T.S. 187.
The Geneva Convention of 1925, 81 L.N.T.S. 317.
The 1931 Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating
the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs, 48 Stat. 1543, 139 L.N.T.S. 301.
The 1936 Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs, 198 L.N.T.S. 229.
The Geneva Protocol of 1946, 61 Stat. 2230, 12 U.N.T.S. 180.
The Paris Protocol of 1948, 44 U.N.T.S. 277.
The 1953 Protocol for Limiting and Regulating the Cultivation of the
Poppy Plant, the Production of, International and Wholesale
Trade in, and Use of Opium, 14 U.S.T. 10, 18 T.I.A.S. 5273.

